Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind ( Explorations in Cognitive Science) [Jerry A. Fodor] on *FREE* shipping on. FODOR’S PSYCHOSEMANTICS Jerry Fodor. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy ofMind. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press,. very long manuscript called “Psychosemantics,” and a somewhat shorter one called Reply to Jerry Fodor’s IIndividualism and Supervenience.’ ” Paper.
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Let symmetry as tracked by the visual system be tracked by the intermediate system and let what is output by the intermediate system again be correlated with fitness as is symmetry. Saying they fail is jerru say that they having nothing of interest to teach us.
To be sure, there are more stringent unpackings of the notion of tracking, but let us concede that this is the relevant one. Or am I completely missing the point here?
Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics
Maybe this example will work better, since there has been at least a plausible scientific case that trichromatic color vision evolved in primates in support of frugivory. Gibsonians are in denial about, for just one example, the challenge they face in dealing with visual illusions. Wow—a truly excellent discussion, all around. One mistake, even in the debates among neuroscientists, is thinking that there is a single answer that applies to every system.
But like many psychologists and ethologists, she often assumes that there will be no surprises at the neuro level, after the psychology and ethology have been done, i. I should have read your post before writing my own comment. While informational states may be a necessary condition for representational states, as Eric Thompson in an earlier post claimed, there are important differences.
Was Psychosemantics a Failure? – The Brains Blog
I have no idea how to solve it. I am also sympathetic to the Quinean objections raised by several people. In these fodod, the necessary and sufficient conditions for individual recognition in philosophese: Same with grue, same with disjunctive properties, etc.
With some sadness and much caution, I suggest that things have not gone well for the Dretske-Fodor program.
Was Psychosemantics a Failure?
From the Publisher via CrossRef no proxy cognet. Not sure what the problem is here. Anyone cares to chime in? Why think they know anything about the semantics, rather than the information flow?
For example, a rabbit and an undetached rabbit liver reflect light jerrry differently. But, having made them, can the neuroscientist claim to have addressed the question of what content some neural event has?
I have heard this from people in Maryland and Cincinnati, as well. Millikan requires that the producer is able to effect a correspondence according to some mapping rule between the representation produced and some world affair. Reproductive fitness is what the consumer needs.
Regardless, those are details to be argued about, all in psycuosemantics context that sees information as a crucial, ineliminable, idea.
A final somewhat unrelated concern that philosophers specifically should probably worry about: Such states would yield rigid, inflexible behavior, as they do in the Sphex wasp. I completely agree fosor our theories of the mind should be applicable to all creatures. Your stuff is always quite interesting. I take it that your argument goes something like this: As a result, empty concepts cause problems for such theories.
Thanks, and same to you, Pete!
All right, this is way too long and loose—feel free to back away slowly! The Quinean indeterminacy issues will arise for these language-like states just as easily as they do for the speech acts of adult human beings. Fodor – – In William G.
I think the science is likely necessary, not sufficient, for addressing the philosophical questions. Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics.
The rat is not, after all, a Sphex wasp, whose behavior is notoriously inflexible. It is only to say that they cannot offer an adequate theory of representation. Anyway, why think a frog or a hoverfly!
It might use something much simpler like the spike rate or count because such things can more readily influence downstream neuronal networks.
Also, it seems to me hard to explain rat behavior without supposing that rats wonder whether p.